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PRECAP; Atlantic Richfield Company v. Montana Second Judicial 





Montana Supreme Court Oral Argument: Friday, April 7, 2017, at 9:30 
a.m. in the George Dennison Theater, University of Montana, Missoula, 
Montana. 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") bar a state law claim for 
restoration damages? 
This question is of particular importance because CERCLA is not 
clear about whether it would bar a claim for restoration damages when the 
compensation for the damages would, by law, be spent on remedies that 
may supplement an existing remedy the EPA has chosen through 
CERCLA. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
CERCLA allows the EPA to identify responsible parties for 
uncontrolled or hazardous-waste sites, accidents, spills, and other 
emergency releases of pollutants into the environment.1 After identifying 
responsible parties, the EPA may either compel them to fund cleanup 
efforts, or, if the responsible parties are unable to afford the cleanup or 
they can’t be found, CERCLA provides a large federal fund, a 
“Superfund”, to clean up and manage the sites.2 The law allows the EPA 
to “(1) perform cleanup actions itself; (2) compel responsible parties 
through an administrative order to perform cleanup actions under EPA's 
supervision; or (3) enter into agreements with potentially responsible 
parties. . . to perform specified cleanup actions.”3 Petitioner, Atlantic 
Richfield Company (“ARCO”), owned a smelter near Anaconda, 
Montana, that polluted the surrounding area with hazardous substances for 
                                                          
1 Environmental Protection Agency, Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-
comprehensive-environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act (last updated Feb. 7, 2017). 
2 Id. 
3 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 4, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial District Court, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-0555%20Appellant's%20Opening%20--
%20Brief?id={E0F18C58-0000-C715-A2F6-E641D6ACE121} (Nov. 17, 2016) (Case No. OP 16-
0555) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606). 
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nearly a century.4 The smelter and the surrounding area were added to a 
list of Superfund cleanup sites through CERCLA in 1983.5 Local property 
owners, Plaintiffs in the case, seek restoration damages from ARCO to be 
used for cleanup remedies in addition to those already contemplated by the 
EPA.6 
III. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The EPA enforces CERCLA’s requirements through a series of 
federal regulations known as the National Contingency Plan.7 The 
National Contingency Plan allows for the establishment of a National 
Priorities List for the cleanup of hazardous “Superfund sites”.8 When a site 
is added to the National Priorities List, the EPA conducts a Remedial 
Investigation and Feasibility Study.9 Through the Remedial Investigation 
and Feasibility Study, the EPA selects a remedy to clean up a site on the 
National Priorities List and "eliminate, reduce, or control risks to human 
health and the environment."10 After selecting a remedy, the EPA guides 
its remedy through a rigorous public comment period after which a final 
remedy is selected and memorialized in a Record of Decision (“ROD”).11 
Recognizing that for many Superfund sites, hazardous substances will 
remain after a remedy is completed, the EPA is required to review 
remedies for these sites every five years and amend their respective RODs 
as necessary.12 
 ARCO managed a milling and smelting operation in Montana near 
the towns of Anaconda, Opportunity, and Crackerfield from 1884 to 
1980.13 Over nearly a century of operation, ARCO’s smelter emitted 
thousands of tons of arsenic and other heavy metals into the air.14 The 
arsenic and other heavy metals settled downwind on surrounding property, 
including property owned by 98 residents who are  
plaintiffs and counter-petitioners.15 
                                                          
4 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 1, 11, supra note 3. 
5 Id. at 8. 
6 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 3, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second 
Judicial District Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-
0555%20Appellee's%20Response%20--%20Brief?id={50101959-0000-CB1F-9F1C-
329C6D668A8A} (Dec. 12, 2016) (Case No. OP 16-0555). 
7 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 4, supra note 3; 40 C.F.R. § 300.1. 
8 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 4–5, supra note 3; 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b). 
9 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 5, supra note 3. 
10 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)-(2); Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 5, supra note 3. 
11 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 5–6, supra note 3. 
12 Id. at 6. 
13 Id. at 1, 11. 
14 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 3, supra note 6. 
15 Order by the Montana Supreme Court Accepting Jurisdiction at 1, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. 
Montana Second Judicial District Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-
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 ARCO’s smelter closed in 1980, and the EPA added the smelter 
and surrounding area to the National Priorities List of Superfund sites in 
1983.16 The EPA required ARCO to perform a site-wide Remedial 
Investigation and Feasibility Study that was completed in 1987.17 The EPA 
divided the Anaconda Superfund site into five operable units, each of 
which was given its own ROD.18 Of the five operable units, only the 
Community Soils Operable Unit and the Anaconda Regional Water, Waste 
and Soils Operable Unit (“Anaconda Regional Operable Unit”) relate to 
Plaintiffs’ properties.19 In 1988, the EPA required ARCO to conduct 
separate Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Studies for the two 
operable units.20 The resulting RODs, completed in 1996, address 
Plaintiffs’ residential yards, domestic wells and pasture properties.21 
 The Community Soils Operable Unit ROD calls for testing of 
residential yards throughout the Superfund site and requires cleanup of any 
yards exceeding the EPA’s action levels of 250 parts per million (“ppm”) 
arsenic or 400 ppm lead.22 If a property exceeds the action levels, ARCO 
is required to remove the tainted soil, replacing it with clean soil and sod.23 
The Anaconda Regional Operable Unit ROD requires testing for domestic 
wells every five years.24 If a domestic well tests over 10 parts per billion 
arsenic, it must be replaced with a water treatment system.25 Today, 
although cleanup is ongoing and the EPA has been actively involved with 
the site for more than three decades, the “cleanup of an additional 1,150 
residential yards, revegetation of 7,000 acres of upland soils, and removal 
and closure of waste areas, stream banks, and railroad beds” remains.26 In 
fact, the EPA estimates that ARCO’s cleanup efforts will continue until 
2025, with monitoring and maintenance work continuing indefinitely.27 
 In 2008, Plaintiffs initiated the present case, seeking restoration 
damages from ARCO for common law trespass, nuisance, and strict 
liability claims.28 In December 2013, the district court granted ARCO’s 
                                                          
0555%20Grant%20--%20Order?id={A0EE9557-0000-CA28-9C76-316D975F3915} (Oct. 5, 2016) 
(Case No. OP 16-0555); Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 12, supra note 3. 
16 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 8, supra note 3. 
17 Id. 






24 Id.at 10. 
25 Id. 
26 United States’ Amicus Brief at 1–2, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial District 
Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-0555%20Amicus%20--
%20Brief?id={A00EFA58-0000-C11A-9522-55E4B071B521} (Dec. 9, 2016) (Case No. OP 16-
0555). 
27 Id. 
28 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 3, supra note 6. 
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motion for summary judgment based on the theory that Plaintiffs’ claims 
were time-barred by the relevant statutes of limitations.29 The Montana 
Supreme Court reversed the decision in September 2015, holding that 
there were genuine issue of material fact about whether the alleged 
contamination was reasonably abatable, which would have precluded 
summary judgment on a continuing tort theory.30 After reassuming 
jurisdiction, the district court denied a separate motion for summary 
judgment from ARCO, holding Plaintiffs’ claims for restoration damages 
did not challenge the ongoing Superfund cleanup and were therefore not 
barred by CERCLA.31 ARCO then sought a writ of supervisory control 
relating to the ruling.32 The Montana Supreme Court granted the writ 
because of the impact this decision will have on trial.33 In its order granting 
the writ, the Court explained: 
If the District Court's ruling on this issue is determined to be incorrect, 
then all of the Plaintiffs' claims for restoration damages would be 
dismissed with prejudice. A ruling on this issue clearly will drive the 
trial and the legal theory upon which the Plaintiffs' claims for damages 
may proceed, and could moot many of the other issues Atlantic 
Richfield raises.34 
The writ stayed further proceedings, including a five-week trial 
scheduled in November 2016.35 Further, the Court granted the EPA leave 
to file an amicus brief simultaneously with ARCO.36 The issue—whether 
Plaintiffs’ claims for restoration damages are barred by CERCLA—will 









                                                          
29 Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 1, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial 
District Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-0555%20Writ%20-
%20Supervisory%20Control%20--%20Petition?id={20F14E57-0000-CB1E-B451-
31FD794EBA53} (Sep. 21, 2016) (Case No. OP 16-0555). 
30 Id. 
31 Order by the Montana Supreme Court Accepting Jurisdiction at 1–2, supra note 15. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 3. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 4. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Petitioner Atlantic Richfield Company 
 
1. CERCLA § 113 Bars Plaintiffs’ Claim Because It Challenges the 
CERCLA Cleanup. 
ARCO argues that CERCLA bars Plaintiffs’ restoration damages 
claim.38 First, ARCO argues that the district court lacks jurisdiction over 
the claims because they are a challenge to the EPA’s remedy, requiring 
Plaintiffs to wait until cleanup has completed and bring the claims in 
federal court.39 With few exceptions, federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over challenges to EPA remedies made through CERCLA.40 
As Plaintiffs did not allege any exception to the rule, the primary issue 
“turns on whether Plaintiffs' claim for restoration damages challenges the 
CERCLA cleanup.”41 CERCLA § 113 bars any challenge to an EPA 
Superfund cleanup, so if Plaintiffs’ claim challenges the cleanup remedy, 
it will be barred.42 Employing a broad standard for whether a remedy 
would “challenge” an existing EPA remedy, ARCO contends that 
Plaintiffs’ proposed remedy “easily satisfies [the] criteria for a challenge 
to a CERCLA cleanup.”43  
In particular, ARCO is very critical of two remedies Plaintiffs 
have proposed: first, that the action level for soil cleanup should be lower 
than the 250-ppm arsenic standard used by the EPA; and second, that 
several subterranean Permeable Reactive Barriers should be constructed 
upgradient of Plaintiffs’ community to protect from further groundwater 
contamination.44 The EPA considered both remedies but ultimately chose 
alternative means to accomplish the cleanup.45 Therefore, ARCO argues 
that requiring it to finance either remedy would challenge the EPA’s 
existing RODs, something Plaintiffs could only do in federal court.46 
2. CERCLA § 122(e)(6) Bars Plaintiffs’s Claim Because Plaintiffs 
are Potentially Responsible Parties and Their Remedy is Not Authorized 
by the EPA. 
                                                          
38 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 17, supra note 3. 
39 Id. at 17–18. 
40 Id. at 18–19. 
41 Id. at 20 (internal quotations omitted). 
42 Id. at 18. 
43 Id. at 20–21 (internal quotations omitted). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 23–25. 
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Second, ARCO alleges that Plaintiffs’ proposed restoration 
remedy is unauthorized by the EPA and therefore barred by CERCLA § 
122(e)(6).47 ARCO’s second argument hinges on the theory that Plaintiffs 
are Potentially Responsible Parties. In order to determine who will pay for 
cleanup costs, CERCLA imposes strict liability for cleanup costs at 
Superfund sites on four broad classes of Potentially Responsible Parties 
unless they can establish that another party caused the environmental 
hazard.48 According to ARCO, one of these classes includes “all current 
owners of property at a CERCLA facility.”49 The statutory status of 
Potentially Responsible Party does not immediately confer fault, but 
ARCO argues it applies “regardless of what restoration activities Plaintiffs 
plan to conduct, or whether they have introduced contaminants onto their 
properties.”50 
§ 122(e)(6) requires any Potentially Responsible Party to obtain 
EPA authorization before taking remedial action at a Superfund site.51 As, 
under Montana law, restoration damages must be spent restoring damaged 
property, any damages would necessarily fund remedial action.52 
Therefore, if Plaintiffs are, in fact, Potentially Responsible Parties, they 
would need EPA authorization for their proposed remedy before they may 
be legally entitled to restoration damages. The EPA has not authorized 
Plaintiffs’ remedies, and it is unlikely to do so.53 The EPA previously 
considered and rejected remedies like Plaintiffs’ proposed subterranean 
Permeable Reactive Barriers to prevent groundwater contamination, so 
ARCO argues Plaintiffs’ remedies have been “expressly rejected” by the 
EPA.54 ARCO therefore contends that, by virtue of their status as 
landowners, Plaintiffs are Potentially Responsible Parties, and any award 
of restoration damages is barred because it would fund an unauthorized 
Superfund site remedy.55 
3. Plaintiffs’ Claim is Preempted by CERCLA Because Congress 
Intended to Vest the EPA with Exclusive Authority to Determine Remedies 
at Superfund Sites. 
Finally, ARCO argues that Plaintiffs’ restoration claim is 
preempted by CERCLA because it conflicts with “Congress's clear and 
                                                          
47 Id. at 31–32 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6)). 
48 § 9607(a)–(b). 
49 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 35, supra note 3. 
50 Id. at 35–36. 
51 § 9622(e)(6). 
52 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-11-604 (2016). 
53 United States’ Amicus Brief at 22, supra note 26. 
54 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 18, supra note 3. 
55 Id. at 31–32. 
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overarching intent to vest EPA with exclusive authority to determine the 
remedy at Superfund sites, to prevent conflicting remedies, and to protect 
EPA's remedy from interference while it is being implemented.”56 Under 
the theory of conflict preemption, ARCO asserts that compliance with 
federal and state laws is impossible because Plaintiffs’ claim for 
restoration damages not only lacks EPA approval but challenges the 
existing remedy.57 Additionally, ARCO lists out three reasons for why 
Plaintiffs’ claim “thwarts Congress's purposes and objectives as expressed 
in CERCLA”: 1) CERCLA grants the EPA sole authority to select cleanup 
remedies for Superfund sites;58 2) part of CERCLA’s objective is to 
prevent conflicting remedies at Superfund sites that may exacerbate 
problems;59 and 3) private citizens’ role in the remedy-selection process is 
limited to public comment and citizen suits after the remedy’s completion 
in order to prevent interference with the chosen remedy as it is 
implemented.60 In summary, Plaintiffs will no longer be eligible to recover 
restoration damages should the Court find in ARCO’s favor for any of the 
three preceding arguments. 
B. Plaintiffs Gregory A. Christian, et al. 
 
1. CERCLA Only Prevents Double Recovery of Cleanup Costs and 
Preserves the Right to Pursue Restoration Damages. 
Plaintiffs argue that CERCLA does not bar claims for restoration 
damages under Montana common law.61 They argue that CERCLA only 
prevents double recovery of cleanup costs ordered by the EPA, and that 
CERCLA preserves the right to pursue restoration damages under state 
common law.62 Plaintiffs’ approach views CERCLA and state 
environmental laws as working more in tandem. Instead of preempting 
state-law claims, Plaintiffs argue CERCLA preserves necessary claims for 
additional liability.63 Plaintiffs point to extensive case law to illustrate the 
congressional intent behind CERCLA, and they conclude that Congress 
only intended to prevent double recovery for removal costs under 
CERCLA and state or other federal laws.64 Plaintiffs argue that if 
CERCLA’s purpose were to preempt state-law remedies for recovering 
                                                          
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 40. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 9, supra note 6. 
62 Id. at 11. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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costs of hazardous waste cleanups, then the section of the law aimed at 
preventing double recovery would be superfluous.65 
 Plaintiffs further object to ARCO’s contention that CERCLA 
requires their restoration claim to be brought in federal court.66 Plaintiffs 
argue that the prohibition of challenges to the EPA-selected remedy was 
meant to prevent dilatory lawsuits intended to slow down or prevent 
cleanup efforts.67 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim does not challenge the EPA-
selected remedy because it is not a claim that “seeks to alter, delay or stop 
an EPA-mandated cleanup”; their claim is only for restoration damages.68 
2. Plaintiffs are Not Potentially Responsible Parties, so CERCLA § 
122(e)(6) is Irrelevant. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs dispute the idea that they are Potentially 
Responsible Parties.69 Using case law from various federal district and 
circuit courts, Plaintiffs argue that: 
a person or entity is only a [Potentially Responsible Party]: (1) if 
the person/entity has entered into a voluntary settlement with the 
EPA; (2) upon a judicial determination that the person/entity is a 
responsible party; or (3) if the person/entity is currently a 
defendant in a CERCLA lawsuit and has been found not to be 
entitled to statutory defenses.70 
Plaintiffs refute the idea that they are Potentially Responsible Partiess 
because they do not fit any of the three categories.71  
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that even if they are considered 
Potentially Responsible Parties, they are entitled to both the innocent 
landowner and contiguous landowner defenses.72  Plaintiffs state that the 
elements of an innocent landowner defense are 1) another party was the 
sole cause of the hazardous substances and the resulting damages, 2) the 
responsible party did not release the hazardous substances due to any kind 
of agency relationship with the party raising the defense, and 3) the party 
raising the defense “exercised due care and guarded against the 
foreseeable acts or omissions of the responsible party.”73 Likewise, 
                                                          
65 Id. at 12 (citing Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
66 Id. at 13–14. 
67 Id. at 14. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 34. 
70 Id. (citing Taylor Farm Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Viacom, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 950, 966–71 (S.D. Ind. 
2002); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
F. Supp. 2d 950, 974-76 (S.D. Ind. 2002). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 36–38. 
73 Id. at 37 (citing Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partn. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commn., 66 
F.3d 669, 682 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
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Plaintiffs add that a person who owns property contiguous or similarly 
situated to real property that contaminates their property with hazardous 
substances is entitled to a contiguous landowner defense.74 Plaintiffs 
allege either defense may be used to show a party is not a Potentially 
Responsible Party if they would otherwise fit the definition of one.75 
ARCO alleges Plaintiffs must establish the absence of causation 
necessary for an innocent landowner defense.76 Plaintiffs argue that 
because ARCO is the party alleging plaintiffs are Potentially Responsible 
Parties, ARCO also has the burden of proving it—and they dispute 
ARCO’s ability to do so.77 Experts from both Plaintiffs and the EPA have 
opined that the elevated levels of arsenic and other heavy metals in the 
region are directly attributable to the smelter operated by ARCO and its 
predecessors.78 Plaintiffs argue that “[m]ost of the contamination occurred 
before many of the Plaintiffs moved to Opportunity or were even born.”79 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs believe ARCO is unable to cite any admissible 
evidence that could defeat the defense.80 
A similar rationale applies to Plaintiffs’ assertion of a contiguous 
landowner defense. Again, Plaintiffs claim that the burden rests with 
ARCO to establish the unavailability of the defense.81 Plaintiffs own 
property downwind of the smelter, so they challenge ARCO’s ability to 
satisfy its burden and defeat the defense.82 
3. Congress Did Not Intend to Prevent State Law Claims for 
Damages Resulting from Hazardous Waste at Superfund Sites. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend Congress expressly chose not to 
preempt common law claims seeking restoration damages with 
CERCLA.83 Therefore, Plaintiffs also dispute ARCO’s contention that 
Congress preempted their claims by vesting the authority for Superfund 
site cleanups with the EPA.84 Like their prior arguments, Plaintiffs view 
state-law environmental claims as promoting—rather than impeding—
CERCLA’s objectives.85 Plaintiffs maintain that their claims for 
restoration damages do not conflict with CERCLA because the proposed 
                                                          
74 Id. at 38 (citing Young v. U.S., 394 F.3d 858, 861 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
75 Id. at 36–38. 
76 Id. at 36. 
77 Id. at 36–37. 
78 Id. at 37. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 38. 
82 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 38, supra note 6. 
83 Id. at 40. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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remedy does not actually conflict with the EPA-selected remedy.86 They 
allege removing additional arsenic and heavy metals from the cleanup site 
does not interfere with Congress’s objectives in passing CERCLA.87 
Plaintiffs assert that “CERCLA sets the floor, but not the ceiling for 
environmental cleanup.”88 Plaintiffs also challenge ARCO’s speculation 
that private remedies ordered beyond those contemplated by the EPA may 
cause a defendant to “simply go bankrupt and leave" rather than fulfill its 
obligation to the EPA.89 Plaintiffs seem to view ARCO’s argument here 
as a veiled threat that may even highlight the importance of maintaining 
access to state-law environmental claims for plaintiffs.90 When the 
Montana Supreme Court issues its opinion, Plaintiffs must succeed on 
each of these arguments to have any chance of recovering restoration 
damages for their properties. 
V. ANALYSIS 
 The threshold issue of whether CERCLA bars Plaintiffs’ claim for 
restoration damages has resulted in extensive arguments from both sides 
and their respective amici. The question, however, may be divided 
(somewhat) neatly into three primary sub-issues, each of which are 
potentially dispositive: first, whether Plaintiffs’ proposed remedy 
impermissibly challenges the EPA’s ROD; second, whether Plaintiffs are 
Potentially Responsible Parties and therefore barred from seeking this type 
of relief; and third, whether principles of federal law conflict preemption 
bar Plaintiffs’ claim. 
 Plaintiffs’ remedy essentially consists of two parts, so the first 
sub-issue—whether Plaintiffs’ proposed remedy impermissibly 
challenges the EPA’s ROD—requires a different analysis for each. First, 
while the EPA aims to return soil levels to 250 ppm arsenic, Plaintiffs plan 
to have the arsenic levels in their soil restored to pre-pollution levels, or 8 
ppm arsenic.91 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ experts have proposed excavating the 
top 24 inches of soil on actionable properties instead of the 18 inches 
proposed by the EPA.92 Second, Plaintiffs’ experts have proposed 
constructing a series of underground trenches and Permeable Reactive 
Barriers to mitigate threats of additional groundwater contamination.93  
                                                          
86 Id. at 13, 34. 
87 Id. at 42. 
88 Id. at 41 (citing New Mexico v. General Electric Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Fireman's Fund Ins. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 941–43 (9th Cir. 2002); Manor Care, 950 F.2d at 
125–26). 
89 Id. at 44 (quoting Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 24, supra note 3). 
90 Id. at 44–45. 
91 Id. at 7; United States’ Amicus Brief at 13, supra note 35. 
92 United States’ Amicus Brief at 13, supra note 35. 
93 Id. 
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While both Plaintiffs and ARCO seem to lump these actions into 
one remedy,94 the Court may find that some portions challenge the EPA’s 
ROD while others do not. For example, the Court may find that the 
restoration damages for the Permeable Reactive Barriers are barred while 
the restoration damages for additional soil excavation are not. This could 
happen if the Court concluded the Permeable Reactive Barrier remedy 
violates the EPA’s existing ROD while the soil excavation remedy merely 
supplements it. Both the EPA and ARCO rely on McClellan Ecological 
Seepage Situation v. Perry95 to bolster their arguments that any additional 
remedies that strengthen the EPA’s remedy also challenge the EPA’s 
remedy.96  Plaintiffs point out, however, that in McClellan, the plaintiff’s 
remedy actually imposed additional reporting requirements that would 
have second-guessed the EPA’s remedy and prolonged CERCLA-
mandated cleanup efforts.97 By contrast, Plaintiffs in the present case 
neither question the EPA’s remedy nor advocate for additional reporting 
requirements. Instead, Plaintiffs seek state-law restoration damages to 
return their properties to preexisting conditions that directly align with the 
EPA’s remedy. 
 On the other hand, the EPA argues that the additional remedial 
measures would not accomplish Plaintiffs’ goals. The EPA researched and 
expressly rejected a proposal to construct underground trenches and 
Permeable Reactive Barriers to manage groundwater contamination.98 The 
EPA concluded that “this approach would not necessarily achieve the 
human health standard[s] . . . and would not eliminate exceedances of 
arsenic in downstream receiving waters.”99 Plaintiffs argue that the 
Permeable Reactive Barriers will allow passage of water and won’t result 
in a change in groundwater flow as the EPA fears.100  Besides the fact that 
the EPA already expressly rejected the Plaintiff’s PRB construction as 
ineffective, the Permeable Reactive Barrier remedy creates a level of 
unpredictability which supports the theory that constructing Permeable 
Reactive Barriers would actually challenge the EPA’s existing ROD. 
Therefore, in the most likely scenario, the Court will find that Plaintiffs’ 
                                                          
94 See generally Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 20–25, supra note 3; Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ 
Answer Brief at 13–33, supra note 6 (where, in each, Plaintiffs’ remedies are outlined but remain 
indistinguishable as far as the law is applied to them). 
95 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995). 
96 United States’ Amicus Brief at 7, supra note 35; Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 20–21, supra note 
3. 
97 McClellan, 47 F.3d at 330. 
98 United States’ Amicus Brief at 2–3, supra note 35. 
99 Id. 
100 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 43, supra note 6; see United States’ Amicus Brief 
at 16, supra note 35. 
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Permeable Reactive Barrier remedy challenges the EPA’s ROD but 
Plaintiffs’ plan for additional soil excavation does not. 
 Next, plaintiffs are likely not Potentially Responsible Parties, so 
their remedy would not violate CERCLA § 122(e)(6). At first glance, 
ARCO and the EPA are correct that Plaintiffs meet the statutory definition 
of Potentially Responsible Parties. Plaintiffs are owners of property 
contained within a Superfund site, so they fit one of the four classes of 
Potentially Responsible Parties.101 This simplistic interpretation, however, 
does not fit the facts of the case.  
First, no Potentially Responsible Parties exist here any longer 
because there is only one responsible party for the hazardous waste—
ARCO. CERCLA § 107 imputes strict liability on whomever owns 
property that created the hazardous waste, operated a facility that 
generated the waste, contracted to transport or store the hazardous waste, 
or possessed the hazardous waste when it was released.102 The structure of 
the statute, however, indicates that identifying Potentially Responsible 
Parties is simply the first step towards cleaning up a hazardous site.103 The 
statute exists to help the EPA determine who may initially be culpable,104 
but naming additional Potentially Responsible Parties after there is already 
an EPA ROD and there is no indication whatsoever that those additional 
parties actually contributed to the damage at the Superfund site violates 
the intent of the statute.  
Second, Plaintiffs have given two defenses for whether they are 
Potentially Responsible Parties. In regards to the innocent landowner 
defense, ARCO is most likely correct that the innocent landowner defense 
would only come into play if a court tried placing liability on Plaintiffs.105 
Under the portion of the CERCLA statute creating the defense, the statute 
only removes liability for “a person otherwise liable” who can establish 
the defense.106 Therefore, the statute seems to indicate that a party may be 
a Potentially Responsible Party even though they are able to prove the 
innocent landowner defense. By contrast, the contiguous landowner 
defense is phrased differently under the statute. Here the statute states that 
a person that owns real property that is contiguous to a Superfund site 
“shall not be considered to be [a Potentially Responsible Party].”107 
Because Plaintiffs own land contiguous to the Superfund site, this defense 
                                                          
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). 
102 § 9607(a). 
103 See generally § 9607. 
104 See generally id. 
105 Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 36, supra note 3 
106 § 9607(b) (emphasis added). 
107 § 9607(q)(1). 
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prevents them from being named as Potentially Responsible Parties in the 
first place. 
 Finally, part of whether Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by CERCLA 
may hinge on whether CERCLA preempts the type of restitution Plaintiffs 
seek altogether. ARCO admits in the first page of its brief that CERCLA 
“does not prohibit all claims for property damages at a Superfund site, and 
it does not affect most of Plaintiffs' claims in this case.”108 However, 
ARCO argues that the restoration claim is barred under the theory that 
CERCLA conflicts and preempts these types of state-law claims.109 The 
EPA makes a similar argument that the restoration claims are barred.110 
The EPA contends that Congress delegated decisions about the degree and 
manner of cleanups at Superfund sites to the EPA alone, so allowing the 
claim to proceed would violate Congress’s original intent. 111 In response, 
Plaintiffs argue once more that their claim advances CERCLA’s goals and 
does not challenge the EPA’s proposed remedy or the authority delegated 
to it.112  
The Court’s decision here may look similar to the first sub-issue. 
The precise type of remedy Plaintiffs have proposed may weigh on the 
Court’s decision about whether CERCLA bars it. A decision that 
restoration damages are always preempted by CERCLA, however, seems 
unlikely. As indicated by Plaintiffs, Congress did leave room for 
additional state-law environmental claims to be made outside of 
CERCLA. The Court’s decision may instead choose to reduce the 
applicability of restoration-damage claims when CERCLA is involved 
while leaving the door open for future cases where restoration damages 
aren’t preempted by CERCLA and are still necessary to make plaintiffs 
whole. 
 Ultimately, in the most likely scenario the Court will find for 
Plaintiffs, but only in regards to their additional soil excavation remedy. 
The Court is unlikely to find Plaintiffs are Potentially Responsible Parties, 
which would bar their claim altogether. Instead, the Court will likely find 
Plaintiffs’ call for additional soil excavation aligns with and supplements 
the EPA’s existing remedy. The fact that the EPA already rejected building 
the underground Permeable Reactive Barriers and the unpredictability of 
the barriers’ success, however, will likely cause the Court to find this 
portion of Plaintiffs’ remedy does challenge the EPA’s. Finally, in the 
unlikely event that the Court finds for ARCO without splitting Plaintiffs’ 
                                                          
108 Id. at 1. 
109 Id. at 39. 
110 United States’ Amicus Brief at 19–21, supra note 35. 
111 Id. 
112 Plaintiffs/Counter-Petitioners’ Answer Brief at 39–43, supra note 6. 
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remedy on one of these primary issues, it is improbable the Court will 
choose to foreclose any possibility of future restoration claims made in 
conjunction with Superfund cleanups under CERCLA. 
